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Abstract: The ability of individuals and groups to forecast a future event, with
incomplete information, by using the trading history of an asset market is analyzed in the
laboratory. The results show: (1) when forecasters observe the summary of markettransacted prices, they do not perform as well as when they are provided with a complete
real-time sequence of bids, asks and contract prices; (2) groups do not outperform
individuals in forecasting, and when the market does not have price manipulation
incentives, individual prediction is better than the group prediction; (3) in markets with
manipulators, where only a summary of contract prices is provided, both groups and
individuals are unable to predict better than flipping a coin. This inability to aggregate
information is remedied when forecasters see the complete evolution of market bids, asks
and contracts.
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1.0

Introduction
According to the efficient market hypothesis, market prices are an accurate

indicator of the true value of traded assets since all publicly available past and current
information is absorbed by the prices through the market mechanism. Fama's 1970
article provides strong empirical support for the efficient market hypothesis.1
Information markets have captured the interest of a large number of scholars who have
tested its characteristics through experimental, theoretical, and empirical models. Several
theoretical studies have shown that market prices reflect the collective information of the
system as the efficient market hypothesis claims. However, there is a long list of reasons
that might lead prices to imperfectly aggregate information, such as costly information
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), dependence on traders' beliefs, budgets, and risk
preferences (Manski, 2005).
The claim that information aggregation is reflected in market prices has been
tested in the laboratory as well as in the field, with mixed results. For example, Plott and
Sunder (1988) find a convergence to rational expectation (RE) equilibrium in contingent
claims or single-security markets with the same preferences across traders, but failure of
convergence in the single-security markets when traders have diverse preferences. Plott
and Sunder (1982) also find full convergence to RE prices when insiders are fully
informed and failure when insiders have uncertain information about the state of nature.
Many features of the market can potentially play a role in hindering information
aggregation. Such limitations are known as “information traps” (Noeth, Camerer, Plott,
and Webber, 1999) or “information cascades” (Holt and Anderson, 1997; Plott and Hung,
1

The article claims that security markets are extremely efficient in reflecting the complete and accurate
information about the fundamental asset value.
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2001). In addition, the presence of manipulators seems to have successfully influenced
prices in the 1999 Berlin election market on the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) (Hansen,
Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004). However, Oprea et al. (2006), found that manipulation did
not damage the information content of prices in a laboratory environment with
manipulation incentives. Manipulation seems to depend on the conditions in the
environment (Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004).2
In addition to experiments in a laboratory setting, field experiments have been
conducted. Camerer (1998) showed that efforts to manipulate odds in paramutual betting
at racetracks failed. Results from the IEM have shown that these markets outperform
polls (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, 1992; Rhode, Koleman, and Strumpf,
2003). Plott and Chen (2002) have shown that internal prediction markets at HewlettPackard have outperformed the company’s standard estimation to forecast its printer
sales.
These studies of information markets have tested the ability of prices to represent
the collective information of the crowd. This literature has expanded to include how
decision-makers would interpret the information they observe from market prices to
predict future events. This question has been analyzed in the laboratory by Oprea et al.
(2006) who found that forecasters use market information in their forecasts and these
predictions are extremely accurate, even when some traders have incentives to
manipulate the market price. This paper examines the prediction quality of forecasters
under a variety of different treatments. In particular, we examine decision-making when
only the history of contract prices is provided versus a treatment in which the complete

2

The article shows that given a long enough horizon, manipulators may trade against their information and
undertake short-term losses.
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time sequence of bids, asks, and contracts is provided to forecasters. This treatment is
based on the observation that in typical field prediction markets, only price and volume
history is routinely provided to individuals and not the full information of offers to buy
and sell for each asset unit.
In addition, we examine how forecast quality is impacted when predictions are
made by either individuals or groups. In practice, many decisions in government,
business firms, and family are made by a group rather than an individual. The
experimental literature has found that individuals and groups behave differently in
strategic games, where groups are considered more “rational” than individuals as their
decision is more aligned with the game theoretic solution. This hypothesis is shown in
several strategic games such as the centipede game3 (Bornstein et al., 2004), one-shot
ultimatum game4 (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), trust game5 (Cox, 2002), one-shot giftexchange game6 (Kocher and Sutter, 2002), beauty-contest games, where groups exhibit
faster learning than individuals7 (Kocher and Sutter, 2005).
In contrast with these findings, in dictator games, groups have a higher level of
sharing than individuals, which departs from the theoretical solution (Cason and Mui,
1997). In a strategic market game, such as common value auctions, groups are found less
rational than individuals, and their performance deteriorates when there are more signals

3

The game theoretic solution, through backwards induction, is for player 1 to end the game at the first
node. While both individuals and groups failed to end at node one, groups on average exit the games earlier
than individuals.
4
When the decision maker is a three-person group, player 1 sends a lower amount, and player 2 has lower
rejection rate.
5
While no significant difference is found in the sender’s behavior, the group responder’s behavior is closer
to the game theoretic solution (send nothing back).
6
Player 1 decides the ‘gift’ or the wage level, and player 2 decides the effort level. Groups choose smaller
wage levels and lower effort levels, which is closer to the game theoretic solution.
7
There is no difference on average between the choices of inexperienced decision maker types: group and
individual. However, in repeated games, groups were faster learners of the dynamics of the game and
outperformed individuals.
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available (Cox and Hayne, 2006). Other findings have shown no significant difference
between group and individual behavior (Prather and Middleton, 20018).
The results of our experiments are clear. Individuals make better forecasts than
groups, and access to the real time sequence of bids, asks and contracts as opposed to just
a history of contracts increases forecast accuracy.

2.0

Experimental Design
This section will provide the design of the two market information treatments.

The difference in the two treatments is the amount of market information provided to the
neutral forecasters in the market. These forecasters are neutral because they do not
posses any private information. In one treatment, they observe market information
through the real time sequence of bids, asks, and contracts; in the static treatments they
observe only the contract prices. In addition, with the limited market information
treatment, we examine the forecasting accuracy of groups versus individuals. In both
treatments we add the possibility of price manipulation to determine its effect on
prediction accuracies.

2.1 Design of Baseline Market Information Treatment
A prediction market was created with eight traders. Traders were endowed with a
fixed amount of cash and a fixed number of tickets. Tickets had a life of one round, and
at the end of the round they would generate a dividend of either 0 or 100 with a prior of
equal occurrence. Throughout the round, subjects did not know the actual dividend of the

8

The empirical results from this paper are unable to show a performance difference between groupmanaged and individually managed funds from September 1981-1994.
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ticket, but they did receive a clue about its true value. First, with equal probability, we
randomly and privately selected one of the two values (states) ν={0,100}. Conditional
upon the state, each trading participant received a clue (Black or White9) randomly
selected (with replacement) from a distribution where two out of three times the clue
would comply with the realized value of the ticket. These conditional probabilities are
provided in equations (1) and (2).

Pr(Clue = Black | v = 100) = Pr(Clue = White | v = 0) =

2
3

(1)

Pr(Clue = Black | v = 0) = Pr(Clue = White | v = 100) =

1
3

(2)

In addition to the traders, five uniformed forecasters where able to view the
market activity, which included all the transaction prices and offers to buy and sell
submitted by the traders as they occurred. These sets of experiments will be referred to
as real time markets and constitute our baseline treatment. The five forecasters had no
private information, i.e. they were given no clues. At the end of each round, forecasters
made a private prediction about the value of the ticket only observing the real-time
market transactions and knowing the general clue structure described in (1) and (2).
Forecasters were paid based on the accuracy of their prediction and traders were
paid based on the value of the tickets they held and their remaining cash as shown in
equations (3) and (4) respectively.
9

A Black clue has a 2 chance of being associated with the state dividend of 100, and a White clue has a 2
3

3

chance of being associated with the state dividend of 0 (zero) as shown in (1) and (2).

6

250, if forecaster is correct [ prediction = actual state v ]
Forecaster Payoff = 
0, if forecaster is incorrect [predictio n ≠ actual state v]

Trader

i

Payoff

= Ci −

Ji

∑

j =1

B ij +

Ki

∑

k =1

S ik + v ( N i + J i − K i )

(3)

(4)

Where:
Ci = Endowed Cash for Trader i (=200)
Ni = Endowed Tickets for Trader i (=2)
Ji = Number of Tickets Trader i buys in the Market
Ki = Number of Tickets Trader i sells in the Market
Bij = Price of Contract j Purchased by Trader i
Sik = Price of Contract k Sold by Trader i

The real time market provides the baseline treatments, and the static time market with
individual and group forecasters provide the other treatments. Each is explored in the
presence and absence of manipulation incentives. As shown in Table 1, the difference
between the non-manipulation and manipulation markets is that in the latter, half of the
traders are given an additional incentive to affect the forecaster predictions. The
additional financial incentive for manipulators, which was added to (4), is given by
equation (5) where T (0,100) is the prediction target given to a manipulator and Fj is the
prediction of forecaster j:

7

Additional

Payoff = 200 − 2 | T -

1 5
∑ Fj |
5 j =1

(5)

Thus, if the forecasters’ predictions match the manipulator’s target, the
manipulator obtains an additional payoff of 200. The closer the forecasters’ predictions
are to the target, the more a manipulator obtains. Hence, the manipulators have an
incentive to affect market prices in order to lead the forecasters to provide a prediction
closer to their target. Table 1 provides the experimental treatments of the baseline
experiments.

Table 1: Market Types in Baseline Treatments
Market Types
Non-manipulation
Manipulation

Real-Time Market (BASELINE)
8 Traders
5 Forecasters
8 Traders →
4 Traders
4 Manipulators
5 Forecasters

The only difference between non-manipulation and manipulation treatments is the switch
of half of the trader roles to manipulators. Manipulators have an additional financial
incentive to affect the forecasters' predictions as shown in equation (5).
The real-time market experiment findings are as follows10: (1) manipulators
attempt to manipulate prices; (2) manipulators succeed in increasing average contract
prices by 7 points over the non-manipulation treatment when the target is 100; (3) prices
are correlated with the information in the system despite the efforts of manipulators; and
(4) forecasters’ predictions are a better estimate of the true state than market prices. The
RE model provided a reasonably accurate summary of the market behavior, although
prices did not fully converge to the theoretical Bayesian posterior probability. Even

10

These results are taken from Oprea et al. (2006).

8

though market prices were not closely correlated with the true state, forecasters made use
of them to improve their prediction quality.

2.2

Design of Static Market Treatments
This paper will extend the previous experiments by limiting the information that

forecasters have in observing the market. In the new experiments, denoted as static
market information, forecasters observe only the history of the market prices as opposed
to the real-time markets, where forecasters were provided with complete information of
how these prices are reached, through offers to buy and sell in real time. Specifically, for
each session that was conducted in real-time trading, the contract price history was
retrieved and displayed to the individual and group forecasters. Figure 1 provides an
example of a contract series shown to subjects. In the static experiments, the two types of
markets, with and without manipulation, are replicated with individual and with threemember group forecasters. The payoff function of forecasters is the same as in baseline
treatments as shown in equation (3).11 Table 2 provides the experimental treatments of
our investigation.

11

When the three-member group prediction matched the realized state, each member of that group received
a compensation of 250 as shown in equation (3).

9

Figure 1: Screenshot Provided to Forecasters in the Static Market Treatment

The black dots show the contracts, orange dots are the last asks, and the green dots are
the last bids before the market closed.
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Table 2: Matrix of Treatments
Market Type

Real Time

Static Time

Static Time

Decision
Maker Type

Individual
Prediction

Individual
Prediction

Group
Prediction

Non-Manipulation

INR

INS

GNS

Manipulation

IMR

IMS

GMS

The baseline treatment is represented by individual forecasters without manipulation who
have access to real time market information (INR). An additional treatment in the baseline
is when manipulators are added to the environment (IMR). Our treatments are represented
by the cases where individual forecasters observe only the price history (static market
information) from previous non-manipulated (INS) and manipulated markets (IMS). There
are also treatments with group predictions where group forecasters have access to static
market information from previous non-manipulated (GNS) and manipulated markets
(GMS).
In the real-time experiments, three sessions were run for each market. Each
session had 16 separate prediction market rounds. Since the history of the market prices
produced by these traders was used and shown to the forecasters in the static treatments,
three sessions were run for each treatment in the static-time experiments with 16 separate
prediction rounds. In addition, three sessions each with the same 16 rounds were used for
both individual and group predictions.
The parameters of the information structure in our experiments are shown in
Table 3. Each manipulator was given the same target in each round; half of the time it
was the same as the actual state, and the other half it was the opposite of the actual state.
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Table 3: Parameter Table
Round

Positive
Bayesian
Signal
Target
Actual
Signals
Decision
Strength
State
1
6
100
2
0
100
2
1
0
3
0
0
3
2
0
2
0
0
4
3
0
1
100
0
5
5
100
1
0
100
6
0
0
4
100
0
7
3
0
1
0
0
8
7
100
3
0
100
9
3
0
1
100
100
10
1
0
3
100
0
11
4
0
0
100
12
2
0
2
100
0
13
6
100
2
100
100
14
4
0
100
100
15
5
100
1
100
100
16
2
0
2
0
0
Positive signals correspond to the number of black clues (n) that are assigned to the 8
traders. Signal strength is defined as s = |n – 4|. The Bayesian decision is the binary
(0,100) prediction a forecaster would make if he had all the clue information available to
him. The target is the number given to manipulators that determine their bonus for
moving forecaster decisions closer to the target.

The Bayesian decision calculated in equation (6) is defined as the choice a
forecaster would make if he could see all the clues distributed for the particular round.
We define a positive signal as a Black clue which has a

2
chance of being associated
3

with the state dividend of 100. The total number of traders in each session was eight;
hence the maximum number of positive signals (n) in a round was 8. We define signal
strength (s) as s = |n-4|. Thus, signal strength varies from 0 to 4. When n = 4, meaning
there are 4 positive clues out of 8, the signal strength is 0, and the Bayesian expected
dividend (V) of the ticket would be 50.

12

100 if prob (V = 100 | n) > 0.50

 0 if prob (V = 100 | n) < 0.50 

Bayesian Decision = 

(6)

Equation (7) provides the expected dividend value as a function of the number of
positive signals in the market:

EV(n)

=

2 n 1 8− n
) ( )
3
3
100
1 8− n
1 n 2 8− n
+ ( ) ( )
( )
3
3
3
(

2
( )n
3

(7)

Graph A in Figure 2 charts the Bayesian expected value as a function of positive clues n
while Graph B charts the posterior Bayesian probability of predicting the actual value as
a function of signal strength s. For example when n = 8 (or s = 4), the posterior
probability of the Bayesian decision being correct (predicting the value to be 100) is
99.6%. When n=0 (or s=4) the posterior probability of the Bayesian decision being
correct (predicting the value to be 0) is 99.6%.
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Figure 2 (Graph A): Expected Ticket Value as a Function of the Number of Positive
Clues
100
90
Expected Ticket Value

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

2

4

6

8

Number of Positive Clues

For each total number of positive clues in the market, the expected dividend value of a
ticket is calculated using equation (7). Given that the dividend values are either 0 or
100, if the market were fully aggregating information, under risk neutral assumptions,
market price prediction should follow this function.
Figure 2 (Graph B): Probability of Predicting the True Dividend Value Using
the Bayesian Decision as a Function of Signal Strength

0.9
Matching the True State

Probability of the Bayesian Prediction

1

0.8
0.7
0.6
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0
0

1

2

3

4

Signal Strength

Each level of signal strength (|n-4|), is charted against the probability that the Bayesian
decision listed in equation (6) will accurately predict dividend value of a ticket.
14

The Bayesian probability of an accurate prediction will be our theoretical
benchmark to be compared with the prediction accuracy forecasters. The accuracy of
forecasters’ predictions in a round is calculated in (8):

Prediction Accuracy jt =

Bayes Decision jt - Prediction
1 5
[1 −
∑
5 i =1
100

ijt

]

(8)

Where:
Bayes Decisionjt =

What a Bayesian would predict for the state if he had all the clues
of session j in round t

Predictionijt = The actual dividend prediction of forecaster i of session j in round t
Using the design of the prediction markets, we can compare the average correct
prediction, as calculated in equation (8), for individual and group forecasters to the
Bayesian probabilities of an accurate prediction as displayed in Graph B in Figure 2. If
the accuracy of forecasters on average is positively related to the signal strength, then we
can deduce that the forecasters are effectively using the market to predict. In addition,
the prediction of the individual forecasters with real-time market information will be
compared to the prediction of individual and group forecasters with static market
information in order to observe any changes in the prediction quality.

3. 0

Experimental Questions and Procedures
In Oprea et al., 2006, it was found that manipulators affected the contract prices

by increasing the average contract by 7 when the target was 100, and not affecting prices
when the target was 0. However, the effect of manipulators was stronger in the bids and
15

asks compared to realized prices. Bids were significantly higher when the target was
100, and asks were significantly lower when the target was 0. Thus, manipulators tried
to influence price through bids and asks but this did not have an effect on forecaster
accuracy. Limiting information to only contract prices would not convey to forecasters
this attempt to manipulate through bids and asks. The question we wish to address is
whether this lost information will have an impact on prediction quality.
The importance of bids and asks in providing information to participants has been
previously discussed by Plott and Sunder (1988), who offer it as one explanation for the
better performance of contingent markets relative to single-security markets. If the claim
that bids and asks constitute important information to the uninformed forecaster is
correct, then we should find diminishing accuracy of forecasters with static market
information compared to the real-time market information treatment. In particular, this
paper focuses on three main questions:

Question 1: Does the prediction quality of individual forecasters improve when they
observe the real-time evolution of the market trades instead of the price history?
Question 2: Are predictions more accurately provided by groups or individuals?
Question 3: Is prediction accuracy affected by the presence of manipulators?

The first question will be explored by comparing the data from real-time
information treatment versus data from the static information treatment. The second
question will compare the difference between individual and group predictions. The third
question will compare predictions of individuals and groups in the non-manipulation
treatment to those in the manipulation treatment.
16

3.2

Experimental Procedures
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate pool of students at George Mason

University.12 All of the subjects had the role of forecasters and their earnings structure
was the same as the previous experiments.13 The procedures are the same as the ones
followed in the first set of experiments. The method of information distribution among
the traders, who had generated the contract prices that were given to the forecasters, was
explained in detail to the forecasters, paralleling the same process as in the real-time
treatments.
Each experiment consisted of written instructions that were read aloud, hands-on
demonstration of how clues were generated, two unpaid practice rounds and sixteen paid
rounds of decision making.14 Each session lasted approximately 40 minutes.

4.0

Experimental Results
The purpose of this study is to analyze the prediction quality of unbiased

forecasters when they only observe market price history. The quality of their prediction
will be analyzed along two dimensions. First, we ask the question whether the
forecasters’ prediction quality changes when moving from real to static market
information. The second dimension comprises the actual Bayesian decision. While the
first dimension distinguishes prediction quality relative to the real-time markets, the
second dimension distinguishes prediction quality relative to the prior, which is 50-50.

12

Subjects were recruited randomly from a database, excluding students who had participated in the first
set of experiments in Fall 2005.
13
At the end of the experiment, subjects were privately paid their earnings, and for a 40-45 minute
experiment, they received $17.25 on average, in addition to a $5.00 show-up fee.
14
Instructions and procedures can be found at http://ices2.gmu.edu/dorina
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4.1

Relative Prediction Quality of Forecasters
We define prediction accuracy for round t of treatment k through equation (9)

where i indexes the forecaster and j denotes the session:

Prediction

Accuracy

tk

=

1
15

3

5

j =1

i =1

∑ ∑ [1 −

Bayes

Decision

kjt

100

- Prediction

kjt

]

(9)

Figure 3 charts the per-round prediction accuracy of correct forecasts for each treatment.
This figure suggests that the best predictors are the forecasters who observe the real time
evolution of the prices in a market without the presence of manipulators. Qualitatively,
from Figure 3, individuals predict better than groups and predictions are more accurate
with real time information. However, in order to answer our questions quantitatively, we
will take a closer look at the data by decomposing these aggregates to the particulars of
the market information available in each round and session.

18

Figure 3: Per Round Prediction Accuracy by Treatment

Per Round Prediction Accuracy
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The treatment prediction accuracy is averaged across all rounds to obtain the percentage
of correct predictions per round by the forecasters. Qualitatively, real-time information
improves forecast quality and groups do not outperform individuals in predicting the
state.

In order to determine whether there is any difference among the treatments, a twosample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for equality of distribution functions was
conducted. The K-S tests in table 4 show that the samples of all treatments come from
statistically different distributions.

19

Table 4: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
INS
GNS
IMR
IMS GMS
Treatments INR
INR
0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
INS
0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000
GNS
0.000 0.000 0.000
IMR
0.000 0.000
IMS
0.047
GMS
The table lists the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for
equality of distribution functions. In these pairwise comparisons using the K-S test, the
null hypothesis of equality of distributions is rejected for all treatments.

4.2

Do Forecasters Aggregate Information in a Static Market?
The odds ratio, as defined in equation (10) below, is the ratio of the probability P

of correctly predicting the realized state and the probability (1- P) of incorrectly
predicting the realized state. Hence, when the odds-ratio is one, forecaster predictions
are correct as many times as they are incorrect, and when the odds-ratio is greater than
one, forecasters are correct more often than incorrect. Specifically, P is the amount
defined equation (8). Thus, for each session and round we have an observation on P.
Odds-Ratio =

P
1− P

(10)

The distribution of odds-ratios for each treatment is provided in Figure 4. If the
distribution of odds-ratio is skewed to the right (below 1), then it can safely be concluded
that forecasters are predicting no better than their prior of 50-50. This seems to be the
case for the manipulation treatments with static information for both individual and group
forecasters.
In order to determine if forecasters are indeed aggregating information we need to
examine prediction behavior as the signal strength changes. The theoretical functional
20

form between the probability of correctly predicting the state and signal strength is shown
in equation (11), which is derived from equation (7).15

P( s)
ln(
) = ln (4) * s , where s is signal strength
1 − P(s)

(11)

From equation (11)16, we can derive the values of the odds-ratio depending on the
signal strength. For instance, when s = 0, the natural log of odds-ratio is 0 and the oddsratio is 1. As long as the odds-ratio is greater than one, forecasters are correctly
predicting the state at a rate higher than the 50-50 prior. If the odds-ratio increases as the
signal strength increases, then it can be safely inferred that forecasters are aggregating
this information in their predictions. The further apart from the true functional form, the
further apart this prediction is from being efficiently aggregated.

15
16

Details of this derivation can be found in the Appendix.
P(s) is defined as Prediction Accuracyjt (P) now as a function of signal strength s.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the Odds-Ratio by Treatment
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The horizontal axis shows the odds-ratio, while the vertical axis shows the frequency of
occurrence. The six graphs in the figure show the frequency of occurrence of the oddsratio for each treatment. In the treatment with group forecasters and static market
information and manipulators, the odds-ratio of less than 1 occurs about 58% of the time.
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Using the functional form in equation (11), the following random effects
regression is estimated:

PredictionAccuracyjt
ln(
) = β1s jt + β2s jt ∗ m + β3s jt ∗ i + β4s jt ∗ m ∗ i + β5 g + β6 g ∗ m + ε jt + µ j (12)
1 − PredictionAccuracyjt

In regression (12) t denotes the round and j the session; sjt is the signal strength in
round t of session j; m is a dummy variable for whether manipulators were present in the
market; i is a dummy variable for our static information treatment; g is the dummy for the
group forecaster treatment; * denotes interaction effects; ejt is a random error term
assumed to be normally distributed (N (0; 1)) and uj is the error term capturing the
differences across sessions of the same treatment. Table 5 shows how the dummy
variables from regression (12) determine the aggregate coefficients for each treatment.
For instance, in real time markets, individual forecast ln(odds-ratio) will increase by β2 in
the presence of manipulators compared to their absence and by a total increase of β1+β2
as signal strength increases by an additional unit.
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Table 5: Dummy Variables and Coefficients Estimates
Markets \ Decision
Makers

Real –Time
Individual

Static-Time
Individual

Static-Time
Group

i=0
g= 0
m=0

i=1
g= 0
m=0

i=1
g= 1
m=0

Coefficients

β1

β1+β2

β1+β3+β5

Manipulation

i=0
g= 0
m=1

i=1
g= 0
m=1

i=1
g= 1
m=1

Non-manipulation

Coefficients
β1+β2
β1+β2+β3+β4
β1+β2+β3+β4+β5+β6
The dummy variables are: static information dummy (i) is 1 when forecasters only
observe the market price history and 0 for real time market treatments; group dummy (g)
is 1 when the decision maker type is a group and 0 otherwise; manipulation dummy (m)
is 1 for all treatments where manipulators are present in the market, and 0 otherwise. The
values of these dummy variables from regression in (12) will provide the coefficients for
each of the six treatments.

The regression estimates can be found in table 6. All of the coefficients are
statistically significant. We will use the estimates from table 6 to construct our estimates
of the treatment effects on the information aggregation properties of the market in the
sections that follow.

Table 6: Regression Estimates
Treatments

Estimated
Coefficients

Standard Error

Z

p-value

β1
0.526875
0.044834
11.75
0.000
β2
-0.146097
0.053006
-2.76
0.006
β3
-0.140854
0.053006
-2.66
0.008
β4
-0.189212
0.074962
-2.52
0.012
β5
-0.191404
0.054995
-3.48
0.001
β6
0.150951
0.076382
1.98
0.048
Regression estimates from (12) show that all coefficients are statistically different from 0.
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4.2.1 Real versus Static Markets

Result 1.a: Prediction quality of individual forecasters, who observe only the history of
trading prices, is statistically lower than the forecasters with information on the full
market evolution, both in the presence and absence of manipulators.
We observe in Table 6 that in the non-manipulation markets, the coefficient for real-time
market information treatment is 0.14 (β3) higher than in the static-time treatment. This is
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. This coefficient translates into an odds-ratio
of 1.69 for signal strength s = 1 in real-time information treatment compared to 1.48 in
static information treatment. In the manipulation markets, the coefficient in real time is

0.33 (β3+ β4) which is statistically higher than the static-information treatment. This
coefficient translates into an odds-ratio of 1.46 for signal strength s =1 in real time
compared to 1.05 for the static treatment. Figures 5 and 6 provide a visual overview of
these findings. In both market types, with and without manipulation, forecasters with
real-time information predict statistically better than forecasters with static information.
The sample averages in static-information treatment fall out of the 95% confidence
interval of the real-time information treatment. We also supply market price data as a
benchmark for the prediction quality of the forecasters. In particular, we examine the
average closing price for each treatment based on signal strength. Specifically, for each
treatment (k) and particular level of signal strength (s), we calculate the adjusted average
price in equation (14) where n is the number of positive clues, ms indexes the rounds in
which the signal strength is s and Ms is the total number of rounds in which the signal
strength is s.
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(14)

Result 1.b: In the absence of manipulators, individual prediction quality with real and
static market information is statistically higher than the 50-50 prior and it increases with
signal strength. Thus, even though forecasts are more accurate with real-time market
information, individuals aggregate information in both cases.
The coefficients are statistically different from 0 for both real-time and statictime, non-manipulated markets. If the coefficient is greater than 0, the odds-ratio would
be greater than one. Hence individual forecasters correctly predict the state more often
than the prior and the prediction accuracy is positively correlated with the signal strength.
From Figure 5 we can also observe that in the non-manipulation markets, individual
forecasters outperform the market prices with both real and static market information.
The dotted line represents the average of closing prices in non-manipulated markets
adjusted with the signal strength as calculated in (14). The average adjusted price can be
interpreted as the market posterior probability given signal strength. The market price
line is always below the forecasters’ probability of predicting the state. However, in
Figure 6 we find that when manipulators are present in the market, both individual
forecasts and market prices are uninformative if only static market information is
provided.
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Figure 5: Non-manipulation Individual Forecast Treatments: Real and Static
Market Information
No Manipulation Individuals
Real vs. Static
Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

Real Time CI.95%
Static

3

4

Real
Ave Adjusted.P No-Manip

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with real
time market information as a function of signal strength. The dark line shows the
individual mean forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows
the adjusted price derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices.

Figure 6: Manipulation Individual Forecast Treatments: Real and Static Market
Information
Manipulation Individuals
Real vs. Static
Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

M.Real Time CI.95%
Static

3

4

Real
Ave Adjusted.P Manipulation

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with real
time market information as function of signal strength. The dark line shows the
individual mean forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows
the adjusted price derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices.
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4.2.2 Group versus Individual Prediction
Result 2.a: Prediction quality of individual forecasters is statistically better than the
group forecasters in the static market information treatment with no manipulators
present.

From the regression estimates in Table 6, we can calculate the estimated coefficients for
each treatment from Table 5. These estimates are reported in Table 7.

Table 7: Estimated Coefficients from the Random Effects Regression
Treatments

Estimated
Coefficients

Standard Error

Z

p-value

INR
**0.5268751
0.044834
11.752
0.000
IMR
**0.3807781
0.069425
5.485
0.000
INS
**0.3860209
0.069425
5.560
0.000
IMS
0.0507122
0.115104
0.441
0.660
GNS
*0.1946171
0.088568
2.197
0.028
GMS
0.0102597
0.858385
0.012
0.980
These are the aggregate coefficients for each treatment using the estimated coefficients
from regression shown in Table 6 and the aggregate coefficient calculations from Table
5. Coefficients noted (**) are significant at the 1% level, (*) are significant in 5% level.

From the estimates in table 7, we find that prediction quality is not improved
when groups forecast. On the contrary, the individuals’ odds-ratio is higher than that of
groups. Table 6 shows a statistically significant coefficient of -0.19 (β5 in table 6) for the
group dummy. This corresponds to a difference in odds-ratio from 1.48 to 1.22 for a
signal strength one, which translates to 60% correct predictions for individuals versus

55% correct predictions for groups. The odds-ratio increases at an increasing rate as we
move to higher signal strengths. Hence, we can conclude that group prediction quality is
statistically lower than the individuals. These results are highlighted in Figure 7 where
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the group prediction lies outside the 95% confidence interval of the predictions by
individuals.

Figure 7: Non-manipulation Static Information Treatments

No Manipulation Static
Individual vs. Group

Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

Individual CI.95%
Group

3

4

Individual
Ave Adjusted.P No-Manip

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static
market information as a function of signal strength. The dark line shows the group mean
forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows the adjusted-price
derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices.

Result 2.b: In the absence of manipulators, both individual and group prediction quality
is statistically higher than the 50-50 prior and it increases with signal strength.
Coefficients corresponding to no manipulation treatments from Table 7 are
statistically significantly from zero. This means that the predictions have a higher
accuracy rate than the 50-50 prior prediction. Using the estimates from Table 7 we
generate Table 8 and Table 9 which show how the odds-ratio and thus prediction
accuracies change as the signal strength changes for the non-manipulation individual and

29

group prediction treatments. Specifically, table 9 shows that individual prediction
accuracy outperforms group prediction at an increasing rate as signal strength increases.

Table 8:

Odds-Ratio in Non-manipulation Markets across Signal Strengths

Type of Market
Decision Maker
Type

Real time & nonmanipulation

Static time & nonmanipulation

Static time & nonmanipulation

Individual

Individual

Group

Odds-Ratio (s=1)
1.70
1.48
1.22
Odds-Ratio (s=2)
2.89
2.18
1.49
Odds-Ratio (s=3)
4.90
3.22
1.82
Odds-Ratio (s=4)
8.33
4.76
2.23
The odds-ratios are displayed for different signal strengths, from 1 to 4. The treatments
observed are for all markets with no manipulators. These odds-ratios are calculated by
using the results from the regressions in Table 7.

Table 9:

Forecasters’ Prediction Accuracy in Non-manipulation Markets
across Signal Strengths
Type of Market
Real time & nonStatic time & nonStatic time & nonmanipulation
manipulation
manipulation
Decision Maker
Type
Individual
Individual
Group
P (s=1)

0.63

0.60

0.55

P (s=2)
0.74
0.69
0.60
P (s=3)
0.83
0.76
0.65
P (s=4)
0.89
0.83
0.69
The probability of correctly predicting the state is displayed for different signal strengths,
from 1 to 4. The treatments observed are for all markets with no manipulators. These
odds-ratios are calculated by using the results from the odds-ratios in Table 8.

Result 2.c: In the presence of manipulators, individual and group prediction is
statistically equivalent.
In Figure 8, the dark dots show the prediction accuracy of individual forecasters
when they observe the history of prices (static information) with manipulators. The grey
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area shows the 95% confidence interval of individual forecasts. The black line shows the
group forecast accuracy with static information in the presence of manipulators as a
function of signal strength, which falls within the 95% confidence interval of the
individual forecast accuracy. Both the individual and group predictions are not different
than the 50-50 prior with no information. The estimated coefficients from Table 7 are not
statistically different from zero, which translates to a prediction accuracy of 50%.17

Figure 8: Manipulation Static Information Treatment

Manipulation Static
Individual vs. Group

Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

Individual CI.95%
Group

3

4

Individual
Ave Adjusted.P Manipulation

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static
market information as function of signal strength when there are manipulators in the
market. The dark line shows the group mean forecast with static market information and
the lower dotted line shows the adjusted-price derived from the mean manipulation
closing market prices.

17

When the coefficient is 0, then ln(odds-ratio)=0 which means that the odds-ratio=1, and p(s)=1p(s)=50%.
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4.2.3 The Effect of Manipulation in the Static Market

Result 3: With only static market information, prediction accuracy is reduced when there
are manipulators in the market.
In contrast to the results of Oprea et al. (2006), where the presence of
manipulators did not effect prediction accuracy when forecasters had access to real time
market information, our results show that with limited market information, manipulators
can have a significant effect on forecast accuracy. Specifically, the individual forecast
estimated coefficient in the no-manipulation markets is 0.34 higher than that of
manipulated markets. This difference is shown by coefficient β2+β4 in Table 6 which is
statistically significant. This holds true for both individual and group forecasters. These
results can be found in Figures 9 and 10. The presence of manipulators has such a
dramatic effect when forecasters have limited market information that the predictions are
no better than flipping a coin no matter the signal strength.
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Figure 9: Individual Prediction Accuracy with Static Market Information
Static Time Individuals
No Manipulation vs. Manipulation
Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

No-Manip CI.95%
Manipulation

3

4

No-Manip
Ave Adjusted.P

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static
market information as function of signal strength when there are no manipulators in the
market. The dark line shows the individual mean forecast with static market information
and the lower dotted line shows the adjusted price derived from the closing market prices.

Figure 10: Group Prediction Accuracy with Static Market Information
Static Time: Groups
No Manipulation vs. Manipulation
Probability of Correctness

1
.9
.8
.7
.6
.5
.4
1

2
Signal Strength

No-Manip CI.95%
Manipulation

3

4

No-Manip
Ave Adjusted.P

The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of group forecast with static
market information as function of signal strength when there are no manipulators in the
market. The dark line shows the group mean forecast with static market information and
the lower dotted line shows the adjusted price derived from the closing market prices.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
Using markets in order to aggregate dispersed information about the likelihood of
a future event is a powerful tool. Uniformed observers can then use the information
conveyed in market transactions by informed traders to improve their forecasts and
decision making.

This paper examined the quality predictions by uninformed

forecasters under a variety of conditions. Our results show that forecasters use the market
information to improve their forecasts. However, our findings show that when
forecasters observe only a summary of transaction prices, they do not perform as well as
when they are provided with real time access to the price discovery process. In addition,
we find that the presence of manipulators lowers the prediction quality of the forecasts
when provided only with the history of the transacted prices. In fact, the prediction
quality drops to a level no different than the uninformative prior. However, when
forecasters are provided real time access to bids, asks and contracts, their predictions
significantly improve even when manipulators are present in the market.
The literature on comparing group and individual decision-making is growing at a
rapid pace, and yet the findings are inconclusive. We have added to this literature to
examine the prediction quality of groups relative to individuals in our markets. We find
that group prediction does not perform as well as individuals in accurately forecasting the
state. This suggests that in a non-strategic setting, individual decision-making is likely
to result in superior predictions than if the decision must be arrived at by a group.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Functional Form

We shall start the calculations from the Bayesian expected value of a ticket as a function
of the number of positive signals (n):
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We have defined the signal strength (s) in relation to positive signals (n) as s = |n4|. The expression inside the absolute value will change signs depending on the value of
n, but the signal strength will always take a positive value between 0 and 4. Hence, the
probability of correctly predicting the state can be derived from the Bayesian prediction
as shown in eq (1.10).

1

if n > 4 or (s = n - 4)
1 + 2 2( 4− n )

1

Pr(Guess = v | s ) = P ( s ) = 1 −
if n < 4 or (s = 4 - n)
2( 4− n )
1
2
+

if n = 4 or (s = 0)
.5



Thus,
P( s) =

1
1 + 2 −2 s

so,
1
1
2
s
−
−2 s
P( s)
= 1+ 2
= 1 + −22 s = 2 2 s
1
1 − P(s)
2
1−
−2 s
1+ 2
1 + 2 −2 s
Hence,
 P( s) 
 = ln(4) • s
ln
 1 − P(s) 
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